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BIANNUAL SURVEY

definite for attachment purposes. Applying this to the conditional
sales contract situation, the debtor-purchaser had a right to possess
the aircraft even though the vendor had legal title. It was this
possessory right for which a monetary value could be determined
and thus it was attachable.
In Seider, the court was not presented with the problem of
determining the worth of the insurer's contractual obligation to
defend and indemnify the insured. It has been suggested, however,
that the premium reflects a minimum value to be accorded to
this obligation. 249 This suggestion fails to consider that the
premium purchases coverage, similar to any consumer item, and
does not reflect in any aspect the actual value of the obligation
to indemnify and defend. In essence, it appears that Judge
Ughetta's objection to Seider is the practical difficulty in fixing
pecuniary value to this obligation. His objection appears to be
well-founded and may find voice in future decisions.
CPLR 5222: Restraining notices- income execution.
A good illustration of the interaction of sections 5222(b)
(effect of restraint), 5205(e) (income exemptions) and 5231(d)
(levy upon default of debtor) is present in the case of Power v.
Loonamn. 250 In this decision the debtor moved to vacate a restraining notice served on his employer. Under CPLR 5205(e), ninety
per cent of the debtor's income is exempt except as to such part
the court determines to be unnecessary for reasonable requirements
of the judgment debtor and his dependents. 25 ' This in effect is
an exception to CPLR 5222(b) which prohibits, once a restraining
notice is served, the transfer of all property or debts in which
the judgment debtor has an interest. If this order were effective
against the employer it would tie up all of the earnings of the
judgment debtor.
In addition, the court noted that CPLR
5231(d) authorizes service of the restraining notice on the
employer only after the debtor defaults in payment or where the
debtor is unavailable to accept service. This affords the debtor
an opportunity to satisfy the judgment before the employer learns
about it.252 In the instant case, the judgment debtor had not defaulted and was available for service. On these grounds, the court
vacated the restraining notice against the employer. The practitioner
248 Matter of Riggle, 11 App. Div. 2d 51, 56, 205 N.Y.S.2d 19, 25 (2d
Dep't 1960), aff'd, 11 N.Y.2d 73, 181 N.E.2d 436, 226 N.Y.S.2d 416
(1962).
25045 Misc. 2d 818, 258 N.Y.S.2d 136 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County 1965).
251 See Widder v. Kaffee, 19 App. Div. 2d 817, 818, 243 N.Y.S.2d 601,
603 (1st Dep't 1963).
2527B McKINNEY's CPLR 5231, supp. commentary 38 (1965).
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should be alert to this interaction. Where the debtor is making
the prescribed payments, the employer cannot be served.
CPLR 5225:

Special proceedings involving substantial disputes.

Under prior law, a summary disposition of ownership of
property for enforcement purposes could only be made when there
was no substantial dispute as to the judgment creditors' rights
in the property. 253 Today, the CPLR provides for a special proceeding for the adjudication of the rights of adverse parties without
resort to the plenary action. This procedure is governed generally
by Article 4 and specifically by Article 52.254
The new plenary nature of the special proceeding in the
enforcement area is illustrated by several recent decisions. In
Ruvolo v. Long Island R.R., 255 the judgment creditor, the divorced
wife of the judgment debtor, commenced a special proceeding
against the defendant who was stakeholder of a fund which was in
settlement of the husband's personal injury action against defendant. The creditor, pursuant to CPLR 5225(b) and 5227
sought to have her rights determined under the judgment and
have distributed out of the fund that part to which she was entitled.
The defendant stakeholder sought by cross-motion a protective
order against other creditors before making the disbursement. In
denying defendant's motion, the court recognized that proceedings
under CPLR 5225(b) and 5227 are plenary in nature and that
interested third parties may intervene formally to have their claims
determined although there is no requirement that notice be given
to such claimants or that they be joined as parties. The court
suggested, however, that in cases of doubt as to the other claimants'
rights the defendant could interplead such claimants if they failed
to intervene and thus, in a single proceeding obtain a determination
of all claims.
In a subsequent decision, 256 the special proceeding was again
utilized but, in this instance, to determine the issue of ownership.
The judgment creditor contended that although the judgment debtor's
daughter was the record holder of certain stock, the judgment
debtor was in fact the actual owner and thus the stock was
subject to levy. The court noted that resort to a plenary action
was no longer necessary where, as here, there arose a substantial
dispute as to the judgment creditor's rights and that adjudication
253 CPA §796; Matter of Delaney, 256 N.Y. 315, 176 N.E. 407 (1931);
see generally 6 WEINSTEIN, KORN & MILLER, op. cit. mipra note 216,
115225.14.
254 See, e.g., CPLR 5225, 5227 and 5239.
25545 Misc. 2d 136, 256 N.Y.S.2d 279 (Sup. Ct. Queens County 1965).
256 First Small Business Inv. Corp. v. Zaretsky, 46 Misc. 2d 328, 259
N.Y.S.2d 700 (Sup. Ct. Queens County 1965).

